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THE FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS OF FLORES
STEPHEN GARDBAUM*

The Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores' that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA or the
"Act")2 is unconstitutional was not in itself particularly
surprising.' Moreover, the Court's finding that Congress had
exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Section 5")4 is not unprecedented in modern times.5 Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion, the Court
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, UCLA School of Law (fall semester), University of Arizona College of Law
(spring semester). I would like to thank Evan Caminker and Seana Shiffrin for extremely helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. The constitutionality of RFRA had been the subject of much debate. See, e.g.,
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); William W. Van Alstyne,
The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1996 DUKE L.J. 291. Moreover, insofar as RFRA was invalidated
on federalism grounds, the Court was adding to the recent string of cases in which
it has made clear that it considers the judicial enforcement of federalism an appropriate task for itself. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997)
(holding that Congress cannot require state officials to administer a federal statute);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996) (holding that Congress
cannot abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court
pursuant to its Article I powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(limiting the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
5. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court), the Court held that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 enforcement power by enacting legislation lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to
18 in state and local elections. The majority's rationale was that when, as here,
Congress legislates in an area otherwise reserved exclusively to the states, its enforcement power must be tied closely to the goal of eliminating racial discrimination.
See id. at 130 (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court). Additionally, in none
of the handful of modern Section 5 cases has the stated purpose of the challenged
legislation been to overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution as
it was in RFRA generally the target has been questionable state practices. Finally,
whereas in previous cases there was often deep division among the Justices on the
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placed new limits on the scope of Congress's enforcement power
and thereby reset the federal-state balance in the symbolically
charged context of the Civil War Amendments. In so doing, the
Court confirmed in unambiguous terms just how serious it is
about protecting federalism.
The Court's analysis, however, is flawed in a way that renders
the decision's importance and implications for federalism uncertain. The Court held that RFRA violated both separation-ofpowers and federalism principles, 6 but it failed to keep the two
distinct,7 unwittingly skipping from one to the other and often
conflating them. More critically, these two grounds of the decision are in serious tension with each other and cannot both
stand: The Court's separation-of-powers argument prohibits
what its federalism argument permits. This seemingly fatal
problem is, however, entirely of the Court's own making. Even
though, if anything, its separation-of-powers argument was the
more central of the two grounds in driving the Court's analysis,
it was, in reality, a red herring in the case. Accordingly, the
Court's unnecessary and irrelevant defense of judicial supremacy-and its implications for the states-may justifiably be severed from the opinion and ignored.
Once this threshold problem with the Court's analysis has
been identified and dissolved in Part I of this Essay, the task of
assessing the significance of the case from the perspective of
federalism can begin. From this vantage point, Flores does not
simply affirm Employment Division v. Smith8 but adds to it,
and the aim of Parts II and III is to explore what may prove to

issue of the scope of the Section 5 power, in Flores none of the three dissenting
Justices expressed disagreement with the majority's treatment of this issue; rather,
they each questioned whether Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), was a
proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2176-78
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2185-86 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2186 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
6. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (stating that "RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation-of-powers and the federal balance").
7. The Court did distinguish and analyze the principles separately only two days
later in a subsequent case. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-78.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws may be
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest, contrary to the prevailing free exercise test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).

1998]

THE FEDERALISM IMPLICATIONS OF FLORES

be Flores'stwo major implications. First, if not explicitly, then at
least by implication, the Court placed new limits on Congress's
Section 5 power. In so doing, of course, it provided a revised
answer to the important question of whether, and to what extent, this congressional power potentially subjects the states to
additional limitations on their sovereignty beyond the constitutional prohibitions contained in Section . 9 Second, both the
opinion in Flores and the one announced two days later in Printz
v. United States," in which the Court held that Congress cannot require state officials to administer federal statutes, contain
grounds for thinking that the Court will perhaps interpret the
scope of Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause" more restrictively than previously. 2 Since, from a
federalism perspective, this clause undoubtedly represents one of
the most important of Congress's enumerated powers, such a
change could have significant implications for the states.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM

Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Flores concluded
that "[biroad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance."" Although the precise chain of reasoning linking the main body of the Court's analysis to this conclusion at
the very end of its opinion is left largely unstated, it is not difficult to fill in the gaps.
According to the Court, RFRA violated separation-of-powers
principles because it could not be understood as an attempt by
Congress to enforce the Free Exercise Clause, 4 which is all
that Section 5 authorizes, but only as an attempt to change the
clause's meaning. By seeking through RFRA to overrule Smith
and restore the prior interpretation of the clause, 5 Congress
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10.
11.
12.
13.

117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).

14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

15. Under this prior interpretation, if a measure substantially burdened a religious
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overstepped the constitutionally mandated boundary between
legislative and judicial functions and challenged the Court's role
as final interpreter of the Constitution's meaning: "The power to
interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in
the Judiciary."16 RFRA also violated federalism principles because in going beyond "enforcement" of the Fourteenth Amendment, it exceeded Congress's enumerated power under Section 5
and therefore impermissibly intruded "into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health
and welfare of their citizens." 7
The problem with this analysis is as follows: If RFRA violates
separation-of-powers principles because it amounts to a "substantive change in constitutional protections" 8 or "[1legislation
which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause" 9 and
therefore impermissibly intrudes on the Court's interpretive
authority, then presumably the states cannot enact RFRA either
because if they did so, it would surely amount to the same thing.
No more than Congress can the states define their own powers
by altering the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. And yet,
if RFRA violates federalism principles because it usurps the
general authority to regulate life, liberty, and property that the
Constitution reserves to the states-and that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment limits but does not oust-then presumably the states may exercise this authority to enact their own
versions of RFRA (or any version between the Smith and
Sherbert tests).2" In other words, if the problem with RFRA is
that only the states have the general authority to enact "substantive" measures protecting free exercise beyond what is constitutionally necessary under Smith, then such measures cannot
violate the principle of judicial supremacy that applies equally to
the states. Accordingly, and contrary to the Court's argument in
Flores, RFRA may violate either separation of powers-in which

practice, then it would be justified only if supported by a compelling governmental
interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
16. Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
17. Id. at 2171.
18. Id. at 2170.
19. Id. at 2164.
20. See supra notes 8, 15.
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case neither Congress nor the states could enact it-or federalism-in which case the states may enact it-but it cannot violate both.
This conundrum resulting from the Court's analysis is, however, entirely of its own making. The solution is quite simply that
far from violating the separation-of-powers principle that the
Court identifies and relies upon, RFRA does not even raise or
implicate it. Given RFRA's history both inside and outside Congress and the sharp criticism of Smith in the legislative text,2
it is perhaps understandable that the Court was provoked into
looking at the case through the lens of judicial supremacy and
felt compelled to put down what it saw as a congressional rebellion. Nonetheless, RFRA did not change the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause and its constitutionality depended only on the
scope of Congress's legislative power under Section 5. Congressional desire to "overrule" Smith notwithstanding, the technical
question at issue was the validity of Congress's statutory scheme
supplementing the constitutional right of free exercise as interpreted in Smith. If valid, then this scheme would displace otherwise permissible state authority to regulate for the general
health and welfare of their citizens in a manner that affords
them only the lesser constitutionally guaranteed right of free
exercise.
Let me expand a little on this important point. It is undoubtedly the case that RFRA was informed and motivated by a congressional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause differing
from that of the Court. Nonetheless, in enacting RFRA, Congress was not declaring that an individual has a constitutional
right of free exercise greater than that announced in Smith, but
a federal legislative right-and one that on its face is not inconsistent with, or prohibited by, Smith. Whether one characterizes
this legislative act as an attempt to supplement the constitutional right set out in Smith or to enforce Congress's different interpretation of it, in itself RFRA does not alter or establish the
21. The Act's stated purposes were: "(1) to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994).

670

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:665

meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and so does not intrude on
the judicial function, although in expanding federal restrictions
on the states it does raise obvious federalism issues. Whether
Congress can enact such a legislative scheme depends on the
scope of its enumerated powers and not on the division between
judicial and legislative functions.2 If it can, then RFRA will
trump any conflicting state laws and may, depending on express
or implied congressional intent, preempt all state authority in
the field, including state authority to supplement the federal
scheme itself. If it cannot, then Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers and thereby also impermissibly intruded on the
constitutionally reserved authority of the states to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens.
Accordingly, the Court's argument that RFRA exceeded
Congress's Section 5 power because it "attempt[s] a substantive
change in constitutional protections " " rather than enforcement
of the existing ones is misdirected; it responds to a red herring.
If RFRA exceeded Congress's Section 5 power, it can only have
been because in attempting to enact an additional legislative
right, Congress went beyond "enforcement" of the constitutional
one. Absent some other enumerated power that does provide
congressional authorization,' the Constitution leaves it up to
the states whether to supplement the minimum federal constitutional guarantee of free exercise in this way.
Not only did the Court employ its separation-of-powers argument to mischaracterize what RFRA did (alter the meaning of
the Constitution), but it also derived from this argument a patently invalid one against a "substantive" interpretation of the
Section 5 power. In effect, this latter argument-which conflates

22. It also depends of course on whether the legislation violates other independent
constitutional rights, such as the Establishment Clause. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Court did not mention that clause in its opinion, although Justice Stevens did rely
upon the clause in his concurrence. See Mores, 117 U.S. 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2170.

24. For an extremely interesting and incisive discussion of whether RFRA is authorized under Congress's power to implement the treaty obligations of the United
States (in this case The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 18, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 28 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178,
ratified by the Senate, 138 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992), see Gerald L.
Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. CoMMENTARY 33, 41-54 (1997).
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two different types or sources of law (constitutional and legislative)-is that since separation-of-powers principles prevent Congress from changing the meaning of the Constitution, they prevent it from making any substantive change in the law. Thus,
Justice Kennedy began his analysis by making the
uncontroversial textual point that Congress's power under Section 5 extends only to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.'
He then sought to specify the limits of this power by distinguishing legislation that "enforces" the Free Exercise Clause from
"legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause" or measures that "determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."" This distinction obviously raises the separation-of-powers issue and was employed to affirm the Court's
established position .as final interpreter of the Constitution.
Justice Kennedy then immediately drew a second distinction,
although he appeared to understand it as simply a restatement
of this first one: "While the line between measures that remedy
or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern
...
the distinction exists and must be observed." 7 And in the
next two sentences, he refers to the difference between legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and legislation that is
"substantive in operation and effect."' But only a conflation of
constitutional and legislative rights, or an equation of "constitutional law" with "law," renders these two distinctions equivalent.
While separation-of-powers principles, as well as Article V, 9
may prevent Congress from making a "substantive change in
constitutional protections," 0 they do not in themselves prevent
it from enacting "measures that make a substantive change in.
the governing law."3 Rather, this second distinction raises the
federalism issue of the allocation of legislative powers between
Congress and the states concerning life, liberty, and property.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2164 (emphasis added).

672

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:665

Throughout its opinion, the Court uses these two distinctions
interchangeably, sliding from measures that change the Constitution to measures that change the law without acknowledgement.12 In this way, the Court repeatedly skipped from a separation-of-powers to a federalism analysis and back again in a
manner that, save for its being unwitting, is reminiscent of
Cardozo's famous opinion in the Allegheny College case.33
Although, as I have argued, the separation-of-powers issue
raised and relied upon by the Court was a red herring in the
case, there is a different separation-of-powers issue that could
plausibly and appropriately have been part of the Court's analysis, but was not considered at all in its opinion. Rather than the
issue of whether RFRA changed the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, which it clearly did not, this issue is whether Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce by legislation its own reasonable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if
this interpretation differs from the authoritative one given by
the Court in the context of a case or controversy.'
Moreover,
this different separation-of-powers issue, unlike the one on
which the Court relied, would not be in tension with the federalism ground of the decision since it relates exclusively to the
scope and proper interpretation of the Section 5 power and so
only applies to Congress and not the states.

32. At one point, the Court referred to the issue of whether Congress has the
power to "enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1," id. at 2168,
which could be referring to either distinction. More often, the Court's opinion simply
jumped from measures that make a substantive change in the law to measures that
change the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause with no indication that it acknowledged a difference between the two.
33. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y.
1927) (discussing enforceability of a charitable pledge on both consideration and
promissory estoppel grounds); see also Leon S. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case,
YALE L. REP., Spring 1977, at 8, 10-11 (discussing Allegheny College).
34. Professor Michael McConnell has recently presented an interesting and forceful
argument for the constitutionality of RFRA based on this "interpretive" conception of
Congress's Section 5 power. See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). Although evaluating the merits of this position is beyond the scope of this Essay, I suggest two concerns that it raises in infra
note 36.
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II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER SECTION 5
With this threshold flaw in the Court's analysis identified and
addressed, it is now possible to look more closely at the
significance of its opinion from the perspective of federalism.
Bearing in mind that invalidating a federal statute because it
exceeds Congress's Section 5 power is not unprecedented in
modern times, the major interpretive question is the following:
Did the Flores majority place new and additional limits on
Congress's power under this clause or simply apply the existing
limits to a new context-namely, one of the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights as distinct from the Equal Protection
Clause? This question requires consideration of the Court's second distinction, the all-important one between legislation that
enforces and supplements constitutional rights.
Yet here again, much of the Court's analysis was frustratingly
redundant, unnecessarily delaying discussion of the essential
point-whether RFRA can properly be considered enforcement
legislation or not. Just as in reality, no one debating the scope of
the Section 5 power suggests that it endows Congress "with the
power to establish the meaning of constitutional provisions " "5
in the sense of having the final say and displacing the Court,36
35. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
36. As noted above, Professor Michael McConnell has recently proposed that under
Section 5, Congress should be understood to have "some degree of authority to determine for itself what the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment mean, and to pass
enforcement legislation pursuant to those determinations." See McConnell, supra note
34, at 171. He emphasizes though that this "interpretive" (versus remedial and substantive) view of the Section 5 power "does not mean that Congress has the last
word." Id. The Court must still review the congressional interpretation in determining whether the legislation in question falls within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers. Professor McConnell argues that this understanding of Section 5 was affirmed by the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See McConnell,
supra note 34, at 172. But in suggesting that Congress could prohibit enforcement of
New York's English literacy requirement statute by legislation under Section 5
"[w]ithout regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection
Clause itself nullifies New York's [statute]," Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649, the Morgan
majority was, I believe, making the different point-reaffirmed in Fores-that Congress may prohibit state actions, not in themselves violations of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority was not suggesting that Congress could determine what constitutes a violation of Section 1.
More generally, it is unclear why, under Professor McConnel's interpretive view
of the Section 5 power, Congress would not effectively have the last word on the
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so too no one proposes that Congress has a "substantive, nonremedial power"37 in the Court's stated sense of an independent, plenary power to legislate on the issue of life, liberty, or
property that is entirely unrelated to previous or potential state
conduct. The real issue, both in Flores and in the precedents
that the Court considered, was how broadly or narrowly to understand the concept of enforcement legislation.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion did not state clearly and
expressly whether or how its answer to the question of the permissible scope of Congress's Section 5 power differed from those
given in the leading precedents that it discussed and universally
endorsed, ultimately it did depart from them. In effect, Flores
establishes what from a federalism perspective may be thought
of as a middle or intermediate position: It rejected both the
strong antifederalist and strong nationalist positions advanced
in those cases.
The antifederalist conception is most closely associated with
Justice Harlan in the course of his dissent in Katzenbach v. Morgan5 and his concurrence and dissent in Oregon v. Mitchell,39
although its origin lies in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.40 Under this view, Section 5 is exclusively remedial and not preventive. The occurrence of a recognized constitutional violation on
the part of a state is a necessary prerequisite for the triggering
of the Section 5 enforcement power.4 As to the scope of this
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in most Section 5 cases. If Section 5 grants
Congress the power to enforce its own reasonable interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then presumably the Court can only review for reasonableness not
"rightness" and would be obliged to defer to Congress's reasonable interpretation
despite its own different interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision. Moreover, in addition to the related principle of judicial supremacy, this would also undermine the principle of legal uniformity as there would be two or more legally
enforced interpretations of a single constitutional provision.
37. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
38. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority opinion upheld
section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as appropriate legislation to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 651-58.
39. 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also supra note 5 (discussing Oregon v. Mitchell).
40. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress had no power to regulate private
acts of racial discrimination under Section 5).
41. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 153-54 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
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power once triggered, it seems likely (though not certain) that
Justice Harlan believed that the legislative remedy for a recognized violation may not impose congressional limitations on
state power beyond the constitutional prohibitions contained in
Section 1 of the Amendment. In other words-and this would be
a coherent position whether Justice Harlan actually held
it-Congress cannot by statute expand or reduce the prohibitions that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states.
Rather, Section 5 simply permits Congress to create remedies for
state violations or to employ legislation as an alternative remedial tool to litigation.
The Fores majority rejected both parts of this "Harlanesque"
position, although not without some minor equivocation. First, it
repeatedly stated that enforcement includes remedial or preventive measures and cited with approval the voting rights decisions
of the 1960s and 1970s from which Justice Harlan was mainly
dissenting.42 In these decisions, the Court upheld Congress's
suspension of state literacy tests and other voting requirements
even though such tests themselves had previously been held not
to violate the Equal Protection Clause.4 3 Second, the Court stated: "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."' In other words, valid

ing in part).
42. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.

43. See id. The equivocation consisted of the Court's somewhat forced characterization of the ban on literacy tests at issue in Morgan as responding to "unconstitution-

al" discrimination by New York. See id. at 2168. This begs the major question that
divided the Court in Morgan because Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), had held that such tests pass constitutional muster. Nonetheless, elsewhere in his opinion in Flores, Justice Kennedy stated that "[p]reventive
measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when there is reason

to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. This

statement affirmed that Section 5 is not limited to addressing recognized constitutional violations.
44. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455
(1976)). Despite this statement, the Court insisted throughout its opinion that Congress does not have the power to enact legislation that expands the rights contained
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exercises of the Section 5 power may result in the trumping of
otherwise constitutional state laws or the preemption of constitutionally granted state authority.
On the other hand, in holding that RFRA exceeded congressional power, the majority also implicitly rejected the strong nationalist position on the scope of Section 5 that was expressed in
these same voting rights cases.4 5 In Morgan, the majority stated that Section 5 is a "positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."4 6 Further, the Court held that Section 5's textual requirement of "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by the finding of a
rational basis for Congress's judgment that the measure in question is necessary for securing the Fourteenth Amendment's right
to nondiscriminatory treatment by government.' Writing for
the Court, Justice Brennan stated that:
It was well within congressional authority to say that this
need of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted
federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch
that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various
conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness of the
discrimination in governmental services... and the nature
and significance of the state interests ....It is not for us to
review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is
enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.48

in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 2166, 2168. This insis-

tence is an example of the Court's conflation of the distinction between constitutional
and legislative rights. Clearly if, counter to Justice Harlan's view, Congress can prohibit state action that is not itself unconstitutional, it is expanding federal legislative
rights against the states beyond those contained in Section 1.
45. In addition to Morgan, these cases include South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) and
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding a seven-year extension

of the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirements).
46. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).

47. See id. at 652-53.
48. Id. at 653.
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The Flores majority agreed that the various provisions of the
Voting Rights Act examined in these cases were valid as necessary enforcement-that is, remedial or preventive-measures.4 9
Although arguably the Court's interpretation of Section 5 in Morgan as authorizing any measure that Congress reasonably believes will secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not limit the enforcement power to remedial or preventive
measures, there is no doubt that in passing the various provisions
of the Voting Rights Act, Congress was focusing on and anticipating at least questionably constitutional state measures. Moreover,
since the majority in Flores characterized the statutory provision
at issue in Morgan0 as a valid "remedial measure,"5' the scope
of any substantive, rather than semantic, disagreement is unclear. Far clearer is that the test of "necessity" that Flores incorporated as the measure of "appropriate legislation" under Section
5 is more rigorous than the test set out in Morgan. Flores introduced a proportionality test between Congress's chosen means
and the constitutional violation to be remedied or prevented."
The Court stated that "[there must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end,"53 and "there must be a congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of
the evil presented."54

49. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163, 2166-67.
50. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994).
51. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
52. See id. at 2164, 2169. One might be tempted to read the Court's proportionality test as not addressing the same issue-of the required relationship between
means and legitimate end-as the rational basis test of Morgan, but rather as addressing the issue of whether a congressional measure has a legitimate (i.e., remedial or preventive) end in the first place. If this reading were correct, then it would
not be a revision. The Flores majority, however, presumed for the purpose of its
analysis in Part III.B that Congress enacted RFRA with the legitimate aim of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith and employed the proportionality test to determine whether the means-imposing the compelling interest
standard on the states-were properly related to it. See id. at 2169-71.
53. Id. at 2164.
54. Id. at 2169.
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According to the Court, RFRA failed this test because even assuming a rational basis for Congress's judgment that the statute
would promote the legitimate object of free exercise of religion, it
did not promote that object proportionately-that is, taking into
account both the likelihood and severity of the harm and the costs
it imposed first and foremost on the states.55 Given its broad
scope, which would have resulted in the widespread nullification
of state laws without regard to their constitutional validity, the
Court held that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."16 In
short, the Mores majority interpreted Section 5 as permitting
Congress to limit otherwise constitutional state regulatory authority only if it has a proportionate justification for so doing and
not merely a rational one as had the Morgan majority.
Accordingly, regardless of the merits of Smith as an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, Mores suggests the following
underlying structure of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect
to federal and state authority in the area of individual
rights-at least once the Court's mistaken separation-of-powers
ground is severed. First, neither Congress nor the states may
reduce or subtract from the substantive constitutional rights of
the individual contained in Section 1. Such action on the part of
the states would conflict directly with Section 1. Congressional
action either would conflict with some part of the Bill of
Rights57 or would exceed Congress's Section 5 enforcement power, since legislative reduction of a constitutional right is no
more, and presumably less, an "enforcement" of that right than
legislative supplementation.58

55. See id. at 2171.
56. Id. at 2170.
57. For example, after Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18

U.S.C. § 700 (1994), in an attempt to reduce free speech rights as interpreted by
the Court in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the Court held in United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), that the statute violated the First Amendment.
Presumably, a congressional antiabortion statute that reduced a woman's right to an
abortion below the "core" constitutional minimum recognized in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
58. In Morgan, Justice Brennan made this point, at least with respect to reduc-
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Second, absent independent constitutional authority, Congress
may not expand by statute the rights contained in Section 1. It
may, however, "enforce" those rights by taking proportionate measures designed to remedy or prevent unconstitutional state conduct-even if in the process of properly enforcing those rights, it
prohibits some state conduct that is not in itself unconstitutional." One important implication of this position is that it puts
even more seriously in question Congress's power under Section 5
to regulate private conduct, including private acts of religious,
racial, or sex discrimination. 0 By contrast, since the Constitution otherwise leaves the issue up to them, the states may add to
the rights contained in Section 1 through their constitutions,
legislation, or common law. Although this was generally understood to be the case pre-Flores, the ability of the states to add to
the minimum guarantees contained in the federal Constitution is,
of course, subject to the proviso that such state action is not in
conflict with enacted federal law.61 Because Flores's more rigorous proportionality test reduces the previously understood authority of Congress to enact such trumping or preempting law in
the areas covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, the result is to
enhance state authority. Accordingly, a state would be free to pass
RFRA or to enshrine it in its constitution. Indeed, one imagines
that this will become part of a new legislative strategy on the part
of RFRA proponents.62
tions, while responding to Justice Harlan's dissent. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). Justice Harlan argued that if Congress, under its Section
5 enforcement power, may prohibit state action that was not unconstitutional, then
it presumably could also exercise its discretion to permit state action that was unconstitutional. See id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Of course, some other provision of the Constitution apart from Section 5 may
authorize independent congressional expansion.
60. This power was originally denied to Congress in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), but this holding was generally thought to have been superseded in
modern times. Moreover, combined with what may be closer judicial scrutiny of its
commerce powers in the light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
Congress's overall power to regulate private conduct is perhaps less now than at any
time since 1937.
61. Or with any other provision of the Constitution. See, e.g., William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
62. Again, this assumes that the separation-of-powers ground is severed. In practice, the ability of states to enact RFRA would depend also on passing muster under
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One remaining question is whether Congress may prohibit
state supplementation of federal constitutional rights. In other
words, although Congress can neither subtract from nor add to
the rights contained in Section 1, can it choose to make such
rights maximum or minimum guarantees by preempting state
authority to supplement their constitutions? Because such a
power would have essentially the same prohibitive effect on otherwise constitutionally reserved state authority as a congressional power to supplement, presumably the same test of proportionate justification would apply, although in this case it is not
easy to see how the congressional measure could possibly satisfy
it. Simply preventing the states from granting additional protection to a constitutional right -beyond the federal minimum does
not obviously promote that right, let alone proportionately.
III. SECTION 5 AND THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
An interesting feature of the Flores decision is that there is no
mention whatsoever in any of the six opinions of the Necessary
and Proper Clause and its relationship to the powers granted by
Section 5.63 This omission is interesting because in the various
voting rights cases that the Court discusses in its opinion, from
South Carolina v. Katzenbach" (decided in 1966) to City of
Rome v. United States65 (decided in 1980), the scope of
Congress's power to pass appropriate enforcement legislation
under Section 5 was stated to be identical to the scope of its
general power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.66 Indeed, it was from this clause, and in particular Chief Justice
Marshall's famous interpretation of it in McCulloch v. Maryland,67 that the earlier decisions claimed to derive the rational

an Establishment Clause challenge. For present purposes, however, this is extraneous to my structural analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.
63. In addition to Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, there were concurring
opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia and dissenting opinions by Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer.
64. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
65. 446 U.S. 156 (1980)
66. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 (1997).
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
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basis test for valid exercises of the Section 5 power.68 Since in
Fores, as we have seen, the Court applied a more stringent
standard than the rational basis test to determine if legislation
is authorized by Section 5,69 only two conclusions are possible:
Either Section 5 is no longer equivalent to the Necessary and
Proper Clause or the latter now should also be expected to contain the more stringent standard. As the Necessary and Proper
Clause is such an important enumerated power from the perspective of federalism-in that it operates on the boundaries between federal and reserved state power-either of these two conclusions is potentially a development of major significance.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the majority opinion stated that
Congress's Section 5 enforcement power is a specific version applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment of the general congressional power contained in the Necessary and Proper Clause.7"
Section 5 constitutes an authorization for Congress "to exercise
its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,"7 ' just as the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes
the exercise of discretion to promote any legitimate congressional objective."2 Accordingly, as the Court explained in Morgan,
Chief Justice Marshall's test for valid exercises of the necessary
and proper power set out in McCulloch is also the measure of
"appropriate legislation" under Section 5.73 This test translates
into the following division of labor: Congress is to "assess and
weigh""4 the various conflicting considerations involved in a
decision to displace state law and authority, including the nature and significance of state interests affected; the Court is to

plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
68. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 142-44 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
69. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
70. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650.
71. Id. at 641.
72. See id. at 650 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
73. Id. at 651 ("Thus the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what
constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.').
74. Id. at 653.
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determine whether it "perceive[s] a basis"75 upon which Congress might decide that such action on its part is necessary to
secure the goals of the amendment. In his opinion in Mitchell,
Justice Douglas made the same point, describing Section 5 and
the Necessary and Proper Clause as "parallel."76
As we have seen in Flores, the Court rejected the rational basis test as insufficient for determining whether legislation was
"appropriate" under Section 5 and replaced it with the more rigorous proportionality test between means and ends." Because
the Court did not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause,
however, we do not know if the majority still believes that the
tests under the two enumerated powers are identical; if so, presumably the new proportionality test would apply to both. Such
a strengthening of the requirements under the Necessary and
Proper Clause clearly would be significant from the perspective
of federalism, for in an obvious sense, it operates at the boundaries of federal and reserved state power, authorizing actions
that are not provided for expressly and specifically in the body of
Article .78 It is uncontroversial that many exercises of congressional power implicate the Necessary and Proper Clause in combination with an express Article I power. I have argued elsewhere, however, that both Congress's power to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce and its general
power to preempt state authority-powers that trigger federalism concerns in the most direct way possible-should be understood to have their source in this clause. 9 If I am right, then
the implications of Flores would be even greater.
Apart perhaps from reasons of strategy, given the Court's broad
understanding of Congress's powers under McCulloch, why might

75. Id.
76. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 142-43 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas,
J.). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966), the Court first
implied that the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments granted Congress similar power to that under the Necessary and Proper Clause. And in City of
Rome, the Court cited with approval Morgan's references to McCulloch. See City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980).
77. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I.
79. See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV.
795, 803-11 (1996).
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the Court in Morgan have viewed Section 5 as a specific version of
the Necessary and Proper Clause?"0 Moreover, why should the
Court now take the second option and continue viewing it this
way? A number of parallels present themselves. First, both provisions appear to import similar qualitative conditions on the exercise of the relevant power: Under Section 5, Congress may enforce
Section 1 only by means of "appropriate legislation";"' under the
final clause of Article I, Section 8, Congress may make its express
powers effective only by means of "Laws which shall be necessary
and proper." 2 Second, both provisions concern measures that
Congress enacts as means to promote a legitimate and given end:
enforcing Section 1 and effectuating Article I powers."a Third, in
that both authorize measures that are not specified as to content
but only as to function, they empower Congress to exercise discretion." Finally, particularly if I am right about the source of
its preemption and intrastate powers, both provisions raise the
same federalism considerations about congressional intrusion on
areas that are primarily regulated by the states.
Given Mores, however, probably the most compelling reason
that the Court should continue to view the two powers as at least
parallel stems from the different contexts in which they became
part of the Constitution. If anything, one would expect the federalism constraints on the Necessary and Proper Clause to be greater than those on Section 5, since the former is part of the original
Constitution and the latter is part of the Fourteenth Amendment
that was aimed specifically at the states and designed to limit
their jurisdiction.' Interpreting Section 5 as imposing more rig-

80. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
82. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
83. Although the Court did not mention the Necessary and Proper Clause in
Flores, it confirmed that under Section 5, "Congress was granted the power to make
the substantive constitutional prohibitions against the States effective." City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2165 (1997). This confirmation is typically how
the Necessary and Proper Clause is viewed with respect to Congress's express Article I powers.
84. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 143 (1970) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
85. The Court notes in Flores that the Fourteenth Amendment "limited but did
not oust the jurisdiction of the State[s]." Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 151 (1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield)).
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orous federalism constraints on Congress than does the Necessary
and Proper Clause would appear historically and contextually
anomalous, and, accordingly, it is hard to argue that such constraints should not be at least as strict.
Such a strengthening of the federalism limitations on exercises
of the necessary and proper power would not come completely out
of the blue, however, as a purely unintended and unthought of byproduct of enforced contextual consistency with Flores. To the
contrary, there has been a recent flurry of scholarly interest in the
Necessary and Proper Clause that independently argues for such
strengthening. Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger have argued
that the original understanding of an independent requirement
that a law be "proper" as well as "necessary" has been ignored entirely in interpreting the scope of congressional power under the
clause and that a law is not "proper" if it violates the principle of
state sovereignty reflected in various constitutional provisions.86
I have argued elsewhere that whether the Tenth Amendment--or
any other provision-carves out areas of jurisdiction reserved
exclusively to the states, the Necessary and Proper Clause should
be understood to incorporate certain federalism constraints on the
exercise of concurrent federal powers.87 To the extent that
Congress's concurrent powers are generally subsidiary to those of
the states, they should be exercised only when functionally justified, and I have proposed that the states should accordingly be
entitled to have their interests considered seriously and genuinely
by Congress before it employs the Necessary and Proper Clause to
preempt their otherwise concurrent legislative authority." In
addition, I have suggested that a rational basis test between preemptive means and a legitimate congressional end is insufficiently
protective of federalism, so that state interests should be afforded
greater constitutionally specified weight.89

86. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 'Proper" Scope of the Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
271-72, 289-97 (1993); see also Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper,44 UCLA L.
REv. 745, 773-77 (1997) (discussing Lawson and Granger's theory about "proper"
laws and focusing on "improper" laws that violate rights retained by the people).
87. See Gardbaum, supra note 79, at 836.
88. See id. at 823-26.
89. See id. at 826-28.
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The Court appeared to accept Lawson and Granger's argument as a correct interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in Printz v. United States,90 last term's most heralded
federalism case." In response to the dissent's secondary argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized the challenged provisions of the Brady Act,9 2 the Court cited to Lawson
and Granger's article as support for its argument that when a
federal law violates the principle of state sovereignty, it is not a
proper law for carrying into effect the Commerce Clause.
Unlike Printz, Flores does not contain an explicit challenge to
the prevailing understanding of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Nonetheless, it may, in the way I have suggested, bear
the seeds of a broader and equally important reinterpretation of
the clause by strengthening the required connection between
congressional means and a legitimate end beyond the current rational basis test of "necessity." Again, if Section 5 imports such
heightened protection for federalism as expressed in the more
rigorous proportionality test, it is not easy to understand why
the Necessary and Proper Clause would not. In the context
where federal law threatens to displace primary state authority,
affording state interests such increased weight in Congress's
decision-making process seems a reasonable interpretation of the
federalism principle that, at least as part of the "spirit" of the
Constitution, constrains the exercise of the power according to
McCulloch.

90. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
91. Indeed, unlike Printz, Flores was not even treated as a federalism case in U.S.
Law Week's review of the Supreme Court's term but was included in a separate
article reviewing individual rights cases, as a free exercise case. See Review of Supreme Court's Term: Individual Rights, 66 U.S.L.W. 3073, 3078 (July 22, 1997).
92. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(29), 922(s), 922(t)
(1994). The petitioners in Printz challenged the constitutionality of the interim provisions of the Brady Act, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
93. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379. By implication, Justice Black made a similar
argument with respect to Section 5 in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), because five Justices argued that the congressional legislation in question intruded into
an area (setting voting requirements for state elections) that the Constitution reserved to the states. See id. at 124-26 (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court);
id. at 201-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 293-94
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J. and
Blackmun, J.).
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Moreover, although as I have shown, the Court clearly rejected Justice Harlan's narrowly remedial interpretation of the
scope of Congress's Section 5 power, his dissent in Morgan also
contained an interesting discussion on congressional procedures.
He suggested that primary state authority should be displaced
under Section 5, if at all, only after serious and genuine consideration-and not mere pronouncement-of its necessity by
Congress. 4 As we have seen, in describing the respective legislative and judicial functions, the majority in Morgan assigned to
Congress the task of assessing and weighing relative state and
federal interests. 5 It did not, however, suggest that this task
could or should be fulfilled in a purely formal or nominal manner, and yet there is little evidence that genuine consideration
routinely takes place-at least in preemption and intrastate
commerce contexts. As in a number of other recent cases,9 6 the
Fores majority drew attention to the issue of the sufficiency of
the congressional record and findings, although their fundamental objections to RFRA were independent of the state of the legislative record.97 Nonetheless, at least in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause,98 it seems desirable from both a constitutional and a public policy perspective that the principle of
federalism-no less than that of deliberative democracy-should
entitle the states to serious and genuine congressional consideration before their primary authority is abolished.

94. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669-71 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 653; supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (discussing the effect additional findings might have had on the outcome); see also Philip Frickey, The
Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996) (providing an overview of Supreme Court treatment of congressional findings when reviewing legislation adopted
under Congress's Commerce Clause power). The Court has not yet suggested, however, that by itself the state of the congressional findings will be conclusive as to constitutionality; it has always managed to find independent grounds for its decisions
invalidating legislation.
97. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997) (pointing out the
lack of support in the legislative record for claiming that many generally applicable
laws are passed because of religious bigotry).
98. I leave open the possibility that the Necessary and Proper Clause might have
stronger federalism constraints than Section 5.
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IV. CONCLUSION

As I have argued, the Court's misguided invocation of separation of powers to justify invalidating RFRA conflicts with its federalism arguments. If separation-of-powers principles prevent
Congress from making such a "substantive change in constitutional protections," then they also prevent the states from doing
so. In other words, this rationale for the Court's decision would
have the effect of taking the issue of supplementing Smith off
the legislative agendas of both Congress and the states, thereby
transforming Smith from a minimum constitutional guarantee
into a maximum one as well.99 I repeat this point here not to
restate part of my argument, but because it suggests a more
general point concerning the larger question of the change
brought about in the federal structure of the Constitution by the
Civil War Amendments. This is a question that Justice Kennedy
took the opportunity to address directly in Fores, suggesting
perhaps that not only 1937, but also 1868 may be occupying the
majority's thoughts and agenda.'
It is generally believed that both the Civil War Amendments
and the New Deal constitutional revolution reallocated powers
from the states to the national government. It is of fundamental
importance, however, to appreciate that when the powers of the
states or the nation are either reduced or increased, it is not
necessarily the case that they are reallocated to or from the other. Another possibility is that they are reallocated to or from the
Constitution. As Madison actually pointed out in this context,
there are three divisions of political power under the Constitution and not only the two for which Federalist No. 51101 is justly famous. The first, and arguably the most distinctive American
contribution to constitutionalism, is the initial determination of
which powers are and are not within the scope of governmental
power per se. Only after this initial allocation does federalism
come into play, to divide the total powers of government between nation and states, and then finally separation of powers,
99. So too, of course, would an Establishment Clause ground for invalidating
RFRK
100. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164-65.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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to distribute the share of the national government among its
three constituent branches.
I have argued elsewhere that during the New Deal period, by
far the most important reallocation of power was from the Constitution to government and not from the states to Congress."°2
During this period of "deconstitutionalization" of political power,
the authority of both Congress and the states was enhanced because the overall scope of constitutional restrictions on governmental power was significantly decreased; the zero-sum game of
federalism did not apply.
With this example in mind, it cannot simply be assumed that
if the Civil War Amendments reduced the powers of the states,
then they also reallocated this power to Congress. To the contrary, the Civil War Amendments represented first and foremost
the opposite phenomenon from the New Deal era: a
reconstitutionalization of political power from government-in
this instance state governments-to the Constitution. That the
Fourteenth Amendment nationalized certain rights means that
these rights were incorporated and enshrined in the Constitution. In itself, this incorporation did not necessarily mean that
any of this reduced state power was reallocated to Congress. The
only possible mechanism for such a reallocation was Section 5;
hence its importance. This is the most fundamental federalism
issue raised in Flores.

102. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of
the States, 64 U. CFI. L. REV. 483, 486-87, 564-66 (1997).

